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Introduction {#sec005}
============

In response to allegations that it is too difficult and too expensive for many Chinese people to seek health care, China's central government launched a new round of national healthcare reform in April 2009. The main goals of this reform included accelerating the construction of the basic medical security system, establishing national essential medicine policy (EMP), improving the primary medical and health service system, promoting the equality of basic public health services and promoting government-run hospitals reform \[[@pone.0190855.ref001]\]. The EMP, an essential part of the new round of national healthcare reform, aimed to improve availability, affordability, quality and safety of essential medicine. It requested government-run primary hospitals to use low-cost medicine with zero profit \[[@pone.0190855.ref002]--[@pone.0190855.ref004]\]. The EMP had been experimental since 2009; it scaled up to all government-run primary hospitals at the end of 2011, which include the urban-based community health centers and rural-based township and town center hospitals \[[@pone.0190855.ref005]--[@pone.0190855.ref006]\]. The EMP was implemented among the hospitals in a temporal sequence from 2009 to 2012; no hospital was on the policy in 2008, and there were 27.6%, 26.4%, 25.8% and 20.2% hospitals exposed to the policy each year from 2009 to 2012 respectively.

Numerous studies have shown some positive effects of the policy, such as the increased service usage due to reduced costs of medicine \[[@pone.0190855.ref007]--[@pone.0190855.ref009]\], reduced medicine costs in treatment \[[@pone.0190855.ref009]--[@pone.0190855.ref012]\], increased accessibility to affordable medicines \[[@pone.0190855.ref013]\], and rational drug use \[[@pone.0190855.ref009],[@pone.0190855.ref013]--[@pone.0190855.ref015]\]. However, some scholars reported some contrary results, such as decreased availability of lowest-priced generic medicines \[[@pone.0190855.ref003]\], lack of access to essential paediatric medicine \[[@pone.0190855.ref016]\], remaining irrational use of antibiotics \[[@pone.0190855.ref017]\] and ineffective compensation for health-care providers \[[@pone.0190855.ref009]\].

One of the main effects of EMP was to reduce the cost of medicines. This would certainly weaken the hospitals' financial situations \[[@pone.0190855.ref010], [@pone.0190855.ref018]--[@pone.0190855.ref020]\]; under the EMP, the income of primary health care providers came mainly from the medical service charges and government subsidies \[[@pone.0190855.ref021]\]. However, the system of government subsidies was not sound \[[@pone.0190855.ref022]--[@pone.0190855.ref024]\]. As a result, many primary hospitals had to bring in income from medical services to cover their staff salaries; hence an increasing medical services was a way to compensate for the reduced cost of medicine. Those services generated income from medical tests and clinical treatment in addition to medicines. We believed that increased OSP services were less likely generating much income for compensation purpose for several reasons. Firstly, under the current medical insurance scheme many treatments and tests could not be reimbursed if they were provided as outpatient services, and hence less likely be accepted by patients; Secondly, increasing OSP was also known a positive effect of EMP since the reduced costs of medicine simulated the usage of outpatient services \[[@pone.0190855.ref007]--[@pone.0190855.ref009]\]; Thirdly, costs of medicine and treatment per service were reduced under EMP \[[@pone.0190855.ref007]--[@pone.0190855.ref009]\]. Hence compensation for the reduced costs of medicine would mostly come from inpatient services. The outcome INCOME that excluded costs of medicines would reflect mostly incomes of hospitals brought in by medical tests and inpatient services. If the EMP effect was reflected by the increased OSP services, the on-going compensation mechanism could be reflected by an increased hospital income. An interesting research question would be the correlation between the change trend of OSP and that of INCOME at hospital level. A positive correlation between change trends of OSP and INCOME could indicate the compensation mechanism at such level. To date, few scholars have studied this problem at a national level. One reason could be lack of effective methods in the typical policy evaluation field to handle the complexity of the data, which have a four-level hierarchical structure; time points are nested within primary hospital, hospitals within county, and counties within province. Clustering effects among provinces, counties and hospitals introduce dependence in the data, which is not appropriately analyzed using conventional methods, such as difference-in-differences (DID) \[[@pone.0190855.ref025]\]. However, a multivariable multilevel model, well-developed and widely applied in social sciences research, can effectively handle these kinds of data to answer our research questions \[[@pone.0190855.ref026]\]. In light of this background, the purpose of this study is to examine the correlations between OSP and INCOME at different levels with a bivariate multilevel model.

Materials and methods {#sec006}
=====================

National Health Resource and Medical Service Survey (NHRMSS) {#sec007}
------------------------------------------------------------

NHRMSS was a national survey that was conducted among all healthcare-related facilities every year from 2008--2012 in all of China to acquire the basic information about facilities for the new healthcare reform. The survey was conducted by the Center for Health Information and Statistics, National Health and Family Planning Commission of China \[[@pone.0190855.ref027]\]. The survey instrument for primary hospitals collected data at the end of the year. It included questions on number of staff, hospital beds, housing and basic construction, quantity of large equipment, income and expenditure, assets and liabilities, medical service and preventive primary public health service. This study used data from 34,506 primary hospitals (township hospitals (TH), township central hospitals (TCH) and community health service centres (CHC)) in 2,675 counties of 31 provinces in China. Located in rural counties, the THs and TCHs provide basic health care primarily for rural population. In contrast the CHCs are located in districts of cities and center of some big counties. They provide primary health care mainly for city population living in the catchment areas. Context information, such as consumer price index (CPI), was obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook \[[@pone.0190855.ref028]\]. The basic data was presented in Tables [1](#pone.0190855.t001){ref-type="table"} and [2](#pone.0190855.t002){ref-type="table"}:

10.1371/journal.pone.0190855.t001

###### Description of the data structure.

![](pone.0190855.t001){#pone.0190855.t001g}

  Hospital   Hospital type   County[\*](#t001fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}   Province[\*](#t001fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}   Region   Year   TETP[\*\*](#t001fn002){ref-type="table-fn"}   OSP(times)[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}   INCOME(¥)[\*\*\*](#t001fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}
  ---------- --------------- --------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- -------- ------ --------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------
  1          CHC             110113                                        11                                              East     2008   0                                             10.294                                                15.658
  1          CHC             110113                                        11                                              East     2009   0                                             10.287                                                15.681
  1          CHC             110113                                        11                                              East     2010   0                                             10.348                                                15.895
  1          CHC             110113                                        11                                              East     2011   0                                             10.453                                                15.885
  1          CHC             110113                                        11                                              East     2012   1                                             10.454                                                16.235
  ┊          ┊               ┊                                             ┊                                               ┊        ┊      ┊                                             ┊                                                     ┊
  34506      CHC             652324                                        65                                              West     2008   0                                             8.987                                                 12.653
  34506      CHC             652324                                        65                                              West     2009   0                                             8.768                                                 12.322
  34506      CHC             652324                                        65                                              West     2010   1                                             8.738                                                 13.306
  34506      CHC             652324                                        65                                              West     2011   2                                             8.907                                                 14.181
  34506      CHC             652324                                        65                                              West     2012   3                                             8.757                                                 13.878

\* Administrative area code;

\*\*Time exposed to policy in year;

\*\*\*Logarithm transformed value.

10.1371/journal.pone.0190855.t002

###### Description of main variables.

![](pone.0190855.t002){#pone.0190855.t002g}

  Variables                                              Variable interpretation           Number (%)
  ------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------- --------------
  Hospital                                               Number of hospitals               34,506(100)
  Hospital type                                                                            
   CHC                                                   Community health service center   2,218(6.4)
   TH                                                    Township hospitals                22,777(66.0)
   TCH                                                   Township central hospitals        9,511(27.6)
  Region                                                                                   
   East                                                  East part of China                8,983(26.0)
   Middle                                                Middle part of China              10,375(30.1)
   West                                                  West part of China                15,148(43.9)
  Year                                                                                     
   2008                                                  No intervention                   34,506(20)
   2009                                                  The first year of intervention    34,506(20)
   2010                                                  The second year of intervention   34,506(20)
   2011                                                  The third year of intervention    34,506(20)
   2012                                                  The fourth year of intervention   34,506(20)
  Hospital by time exposed to policy (year)                                                
   0                                                     No exposure                       83,766(48.6)
   1                                                     One-year policy exposure          34,506(20.0)
   2                                                     Two-year policy exposure          26,791(15.5)
   3                                                     Three-year policy exposure        18,201(10.5)
   4                                                     Four-year policy exposure         9,266(5.4)
  OSP(times)[\*\*](#t002fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}                                        *Mean (SD)*
   2008                                                  OSP of 2008                       9.44(1.19)
   2009                                                  OSP of 2009                       9.53(1.20)
   2010                                                  OSP of 2010                       9.54(1.21)
   2011                                                  OSP of 2011                       9.56(1.23)
   2012                                                  OSP of 2012                       9.68(1.24)
  INCOME(**¥**)[\*\*](#t002fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}                                     *Mean (SD)*
   2008                                                  INCOME of 2008                    13.5(1.26)
   2009                                                  INCOME of 2009                    13.7(1.25)
   2010                                                  INCOME of 2010                    14.0(1.21)
   2011                                                  INCOME of 2011                    14.3(1.18)
   2012                                                  INCOME of 2012                    14.5(1.16)

\*\* Mean & SD after logarithm transformation.

Basic information variables {#sec008}
---------------------------

Six hospital-level measures are: (1) time exposed to policy of hospital in year (TETP) ranged from 0 to 4 years, (2) location (eastern, central and western regions of China) and hospital type, (3) quantity of staff, (4) quantity of health technical personnel, (5) quantity of bed space, and (6) total assets. These variables showed the basic features of the hospital in terms of staff, assets and equipment, and properly reflected the characteristics of the hospital. Dividing measures (4) and (5) by measure (3), we obtained two new variables: health technical personnel ratio (HTPR) and bed space ratio (BSR), respectively, to measure relative quality of human resource and relative treatment bed space. In addition, dividing measure (6) by measure (3), the logarithm transformed into the new variable, total asset ratio (LTAR), to reflect a relative capacity in medical tests or diagnosis.

Outcome variables {#sec009}
-----------------

Two main outcomes at the hospital level are: (1) number of outpatient service provision (OSP) and (2) total income, excluding income from essential medicine (INCOME). INCOME was adjusted by the nation's CPI in each year against that in 2012, and logarithm transformation was performed on both OSP and INCOME due to their skewed distributions.

Statistical analysis {#sec010}
--------------------

We were interested in four questions. Firstly, were OSP and INCOME correlated overall, and if so, in what direction? Secondly, were there dose-response effects (or change trends) of the EMP for OSP and INCOME overall? If so, it could demonstrate the general intensity and sustainability of the EMP. Thirdly, would the correlations and the dose-response effects remaining after adjusting for covariates? Fourthly, were OSP and INCOME correlated in terms of their mean values and dose-response effects of the EMP at corresponding levels, respectively? This could remind us whether the two outcomes followed the same trend as the EMP.

Based on the data structure, previous research had applied four-level repeated measures models to assess dose-response effects of the EMP policy for single outcome, such as OSP \[[@pone.0190855.ref029]\]. For correlation of two outcomes, multivariate multilevel models were constructed by creating an extra level "below" the original level 1 units to define the multivariate structure \[[@pone.0190855.ref030]\]. Thus, to answer the first question, we first fitted a bivariate, five-level null model to examine correlations between OSP and INCOME in terms of their mean values. Then, to answer the second question, we fitted a bivariate, five-level model with independent variable TETP to identify the dose-respond effects of the EMP. Thirdly, we fitted a bivariate, five-level model with explanatory variables to answer the third question, adjusting effects of time period and some hospital resources, which included HTPR, LTAR, the location and the type of the hospital. And last, we fitted bivariate, five-level random effects regression models to answer the fourth question. We used MLwiN software to conduct the multilevel analysis \[[@pone.0190855.ref031]\].

Results {#sec011}
=======

Bivariate, five-level null model for unadjusted overall correlation between OSP and INCOME {#sec012}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

We fitted a bivariate, five-level null model to obtain the raw correlation relationship between OSP and INCOME at different levels of the data structure without adjusting other influential factors. Specific definitions for the hierarchy included:

1.  Level 5: provinces, denoted by m;

2.  Level 4: counties, denoted by l;

3.  Level 3: hospitals, denoted by k;

4.  Level 2: time, denoted by j;

5.  Level 1: indicator to define the bivariate structure, denoted by r;

Details of the model were introduced as following: $$\begin{array}{ll}
{resp_{rjklm}} & {= I(r = 1) \times const \times \beta_{0} + I(r = 2) \times const \times \beta_{1}} \\
 & {+ I(r = 1) \times (g_{0m} + f_{0lm} + v_{0klm} + u_{0jklm}) + I(r = 2) \times (g_{1m} + f_{1lm} + v_{1klm} + u_{1jklm})} \\
\end{array}$$ $$\left. \left\lbrack \begin{array}{l}
g_{0m} \\
g_{1m} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack \right.\sim\left. N(0,\Omega_{g}):\Omega_{g} = \left\lbrack \begin{array}{ll}
\sigma_{g0}^{2} & \\
\sigma_{g01} & \sigma_{g1}^{2} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack\mspace{180mu}\left\lbrack \begin{array}{l}
f_{0lm} \\
f_{1lm} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack \right.\sim\left. N(0,\Omega_{f}):\Omega_{f} = \left\lbrack \begin{array}{ll}
\sigma_{f0}^{2} & \\
\sigma_{f01} & \sigma_{f1}^{2} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack\mspace{180mu}\left\lbrack \begin{array}{l}
v_{0klm} \\
v_{1klm} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack \right.\sim\left. N(0,\Omega_{v}):\Omega_{v} = \left\lbrack \begin{array}{ll}
\sigma_{v0}^{2} & \\
\sigma_{v01} & \sigma_{v1}^{2} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack\mspace{180mu}\left\lbrack \begin{array}{l}
u_{0jklm} \\
u_{1jklm} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack \right.\sim N(0,\Omega_{u}):\Omega_{u} = \left\lbrack \begin{array}{ll}
\sigma_{u0}^{2} & \\
\sigma_{u01} & \sigma_{u1}^{2} \\
\end{array} \right\rbrack$$ The terms *resp*~1*jklm*~, *resp*~2*jklm*~ stood for OSP and INCOME respectively; while *β*~*0*~, *β*~*1*~ were the regression coefficients of constant item *const* (value equal to 1) for the two outcomes. Meanwhile, *g*~0*m*~, *f*~0*lm*~, *v*~0*klm*~, and *u*~0*jklm*~ were residual of *const* at levels five, four, three and two for OSP, and the same for INCOME. *β*~*0*~ and *β*~*1*~ were the mean values of OSP and INCOME, and they were the fixed coefficients of the model.

In addition, Ω~*g*~, Ω~*f*~, Ω~*v*~ and Ω~*u*~ were variance and covariance matrices for residuals of units at levels five, four, three and two respectively. Following the definition of Pearson's correlation, elements in these matrices could be used to calculate correlation relationships between OSP and INCOME at corresponding levels, and they were the random coefficients of the model.

The estimate of fixed and random parameters was presented in [Table 3](#pone.0190855.t003){ref-type="table"}.

10.1371/journal.pone.0190855.t003

###### The estimate value of bivariate five-level null model.

![](pone.0190855.t003){#pone.0190855.t003g}

  Effects               Parameters            Coefficients (standard error)   χ^2^      *P*
  --------------------- --------------------- ------------------------------- --------- ---------
  Fixed effects         *β*~*0*~ (constant)   9.676(0.154)                    3947.8    \<0.000
  *β*~*1*~ (constant)   14.156(0.182)         6049.8                          \<0.000   
  Random effects                                                                        
  level 5 (province)    $\sigma_{g0}^{2}$     0.729(0.188)                    15.0      \<0.001
  *σ*~*g*01~            0.821(0.216)          14.4                            \<0.001   
  $\sigma_{g1}^{2}$     1.018(0.261)          15.2                            \<0.001   
  level 4 (county)      $\sigma_{f0}^{2}$     0.324(0.011)                    867.6     \<0.000
  *σ*~*f*01~            0.148(0.008)          342.3                           \<0.000   
  $\sigma_{f1}^{2}$     0.366(0.012)          930.3                           \<0.000   
  level 3 (hospital)    $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$     0.541(0.005)                    11707.2   \<0.000
  *σ*~*v*01~            −0.006(0.003)         4.0                             0.046     
  $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$     0.413(0.004)          10660.6                         \<0.000   
  level 2 (time)        $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$     0.202(0.001)                    40840.0   \<0.000
  *σ*~*u*01~            0.036(0.001)          1296.0                          \<0.000   
  $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$     0.356(0.001)          126736.0                        \<0.000   

The Pearson's correlation coefficient between the two outcomes was calculated based on the estimated variance-covariance in [Table 3](#pone.0190855.t003){ref-type="table"} for each level in the data respectively as follows: $$\text{Among}\mspace{180mu}\text{provinces}:\mspace{180mu} r_{5} = \frac{0.821}{\sqrt{0.729 \times 1.018}} = 0.953;\mspace{180mu}\text{Among}\mspace{180mu}\text{counties}:\mspace{180mu} r_{4} = \frac{0.148}{\sqrt{0.324 \times 0.366}} = 0.430$$ $$\text{Among}\mspace{180mu}\text{hospitals}:\mspace{180mu} r_{3} = \frac{- 0.006}{\sqrt{0.541 \times 0.413}} = - 0.013;\mspace{180mu}\text{Among}\mspace{180mu}\text{time}\mspace{180mu}\text{points}:\mspace{180mu} r_{2} = \frac{0.036}{\sqrt{0.202 \times 0.356}} = 0.134$$

Based on the model estimates we obtained a strong positive association between mean values of OSP and INCOME among 31 provinces, moderately positive among 2,675 counties, and weak among 34,506 facilities and time points. Testing the significance of the covariance between the two outcomes (*σ*~*g*01~, *σ*~*f*01~, *σ*~*v*01~, *σ*~*u*01~) at the four levels jointly using a generalized Wald test, we obtained *χ*^2^ test statistic with with *P* values as less than 0.000, less than 0.000, 0.046 and less than 0.000 respectively, as shown in the last column in [Table 3](#pone.0190855.t003){ref-type="table"}. This suggested that the two outcomes' correlation at corresponding levels had statistical significance. More out-patient services brought more income to the facilities across provinces and among counties are generally expected as hospital performance. Further question of analysis is whether dose-response effects of the EMP of the two outcomes were also correlated among counties and facilities in particular, to examine possible compensation mechanism.

Bivariate, five-level model for fixed dose-response effects and effects of independent variables {#sec013}
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

### Dose-response effects of the EMP {#sec014}

We first brought an independent variable, hospital by time exposed to policy (TETP), into the null model to identify the raw dose-response effects of the EMP. The fixed part of the model was as follows, and the estimated values are presented in [Table 4](#pone.0190855.t004){ref-type="table"}. The random effects in relation to residuals at all levels remained unchanged from the last model. $$\begin{array}{ll}
{resp_{rjklm}} & {= I(r = 1) \times const \times \beta_{0} + I(r = 2) \times const \times \beta_{1} + I(r = 1) \times TETP \times \beta_{2} + I(r = 2) \times TETP \times \beta_{3}} \\
 & {+ I(r = 1) \times (g_{0m} + f_{0lm} + v_{0klm} + u_{0jklm}) + I(r = 2) \times (g_{1m} + f_{1lm} + v_{1klm} + u_{1jklm})} \\
\end{array}$$ *β*~*2*~ and *β*~*3*~ were the mean values of dose-effects of EMP for OSP and INCOME respectively, and they reflected the strength and direction of EMP effects.

10.1371/journal.pone.0190855.t004

###### The estimate value of dose-effect model.

![](pone.0190855.t004){#pone.0190855.t004g}

  Effects               Parameters                                          Coefficient (standard error)   χ^2^      *P*
  --------------------- --------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ --------- ---------
  **Fixed effects**     *β*~*0*~ (constant)                                 9.610(0.154)                   3894.1    \<0.000
  *β*~*1*~ (constant)   13.843(0.181)                                       5849.3                         \<0.000   
  *β*~*2*~              0.064(0.001)                                        4096.0                         \<0.000   
  *β*~*3*~              0.310(0.001)                                        961.0                          \<0.000   
  **Random effects**                                                                                                 
  level 5 (province)    $\sigma_{g0}^{2}$                                   0.731(0.187)                   15.3      \<0.001
  *σ*~*g*01~            0.820(0.214)                                        14.7                           \<0.001   
  $\sigma_{g1}^{2}$     1.010(0.258)                                        15.3                           \<0.001   
  level 4 (county)      $\sigma_{f0}^{2}$                                   0.320(0.011)                   846.3     \<0.000
  *σ*~*f*01~            0.137(0.008)                                        293.3                          \<0.000   
  $\sigma_{f1}^{2}$     0.361(0.012)                                        905.0                          \<0.000   
  level 3 (hospital)    $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$                                   0.541(0.005)                   11707.2   \<0.000
  *σ*~*v*01~            [\*](#t004fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}0.000(0.003)   0.024                          0.877     
  $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$     0.473(0.004)                                        13983.1                        \<0.000   
  level 2 (time)        $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$                                   0.196(0.001)                   38416.0   \<0.000
  *σ*~*u*01~            0.008(0.001)                                        64.0                           \<0.000   
  $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$     0.219(0.001)                                        47961.0                        \<0.000   

\*0.00048(0.00307)

The results showed that dose-effects of EMP for OSP and INCOME were positive and significant, with *P* values both less than 0.000, demonstrating both increased OSP and INCOME as the exposure time to the EMP policy increased. The inclusion of the TETP variable reduced the -2\*log likelihood from 691297.7 down to 624794.3 to give a much improved model showing significant effects of the dose-response trends. Meanwhile, the correlations between the two outcomes had no obvious changes.

### Adjusting for effects of time period and hospital resources {#sec015}

We introduced other explanatory variables---year (comparing to year 2008), HTPR, LTAR, hospital type (comparing to CHC), region (comparing to East), the first order interaction between TETP and hospital type, and the first order interaction between TETP and region---into the model to adjust the confounders, and then we identified the correlation relationship between OSP and INCOME at different levels and the true dose-response effects of the EMP. The estimated values are presented in [Table 5](#pone.0190855.t005){ref-type="table"}. $$\begin{array}{ll}
{resp_{rjklm}} & {= I(r = 1) \times const \times \beta_{0} + I(r = 2) \times const \times \beta_{1} + I(r = 1) \times TETP \times \beta_{2} + I(r = 2) \times TETP \times \beta_{3} + (I(r = 1) + I(r = 2)) \times X \times \beta_{x}} \\
 & {+ I(r = 1) \times (g_{0m} + f_{0lm} + v_{0klm} + u_{0jklm}) + I(r = 2) \times (g_{1m} + f_{1lm} + v_{1klm} + u_{1jklm})} \\
\end{array}$$ *X* stood for the other explanatory variables, and *β*~*x*~ were their regression coefficients.

10.1371/journal.pone.0190855.t005

###### The estimate of model after adjusting for effects of time period and hospital resources.

![](pone.0190855.t005){#pone.0190855.t005g}

  Effects                                                      Parameters                                          OSP            INCOME                                              
  ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------- -------------- --------- --------------- --------------- --------- ---------
  **Fixed effects**                                            *Const*(*β*~*0*~, *β*~*1*~)                         9.560(0.173)   3053.7    \<0.000         14.460(0.208)   5849.3    \<0.000
  TETP(*β*~*2*~, *β*~*3*~)                                     0.044(0.005)                                        77.4           \<0.000   -0.052(0.004)   961.0           \<0.000   
  HTPR                                                         0.309(0.013)                                        565.0          \<0.000   -0.029(0.012)   5.8             0.016     
  LTAR                                                         0.033(0.001)                                        1089.0         \<0.000   0.008(0.001)    64.0            \<0.000   
  Hospital type                                                                                                                                                                       
   TH                                                          -0.125(0.025)                                       25.0           \<0.000   -0.672(0.021)   1024.0          \<0.000   
   TCH                                                         -0.129(0.026)                                       24.6           \<0.000   0.218(0.021)    107.8           \<0.000   
  Region                                                                                                                                                                              
   Middle                                                      -0.620(0.285)                                       4.7            0.030     -0.597(0.348)   2.9             0.089     
   West                                                        -0.791(0.188)                                       17.7           \<0.000   -0.914(0.224)   16.6            \<0.000   
  The first order interaction between TETP and hospital type                                                                                                                          
   TETP with TH                                                -0.017(0.004)                                       18.1           \<0.000   0.072(0.004)    324.0           \<0.000   
   TETP with TCH                                               -0.017(0.005)                                       11.6           \<0.001   0.024(0.004)    36.0            \<0.000   
  The first order interaction between TETP and region                                                                                                                                 
   TETP with Middle                                            -0.016(0.003)                                       28.4           \<0.000   -0.004(0.003)   1.8             0.180     
   TETP with West                                              -0.024(0.003)                                       64.0           \<0.000   0.004(0.002)    4.0             0.046     
  Year                                                                                                                                                                                
   2009                                                        0.074(0.003)                                        608.4          \<0.000   0.230(0.003)    5877.8          \<0.000   
   2010                                                        0.075(0.004)                                        351.6          \<0.000   0.480(0.004)    14400.0         \<0.000   
   2011                                                        0.084(0.005)                                        282.2          \<0.000   0.818(0.005)    26765.0         \<0.000   
   2012                                                        0.182(0.007)                                        676.0          \<0.000   1.022(0.006)    29013.4         \<0.000   
  **Random effects**                                           ***β (SE)***                                        **χ**^**2**^   ***P***                                             
  level 5 (province)                                           $\sigma_{g0}^{2}$                                   0.411(0.106)   15.0      \<0.001                                   
  *σ*~*g*01~                                                   0.458(0.123)                                        13.9           \<0.001                                             
  $\sigma_{g1}^{2}$                                            0.621(0.159)                                        15.3           \<0.000                                             
  level 4 (county)                                             $\sigma_{f0}^{2}$                                   0.308(0.010)   948.6     \<0.000                                   
  *σ*~*f*01~                                                   0.131(0.008)                                        268.1          \<0.000                                             
  $\sigma_{f1}^{2}$                                            0.351(0.011)                                        1018.2         \<0.000                                             
  level 3 (hospital)                                           $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$                                   0.523(0.004)   17095.6   \<0.000                                   
  *σ*~*v*01~                                                   0.001(0.002)                                        0.25           0.617                                               
  $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$                                            0.312(0.003)                                        10816.0        \<0.000                                             
  level 2 (time)                                               $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$                                   0.194(0.001)   37636.0   \<0.000                                   
  *σ*~*u*01~                                                   [\*](#t005fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}0.003(0.000)   25.0           \<0.000                                             
  $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$                                            0.177(0.001)                                        31329.0        \<0.000                                             

\*0.0025(0.0005)

After adjusting for the confounders, the estimated correlation coefficients between the mean values of OSP and INCOME were 0.906, 0.398, 0.002, and 0.014 at the four levels, with *P* values of the *χ*^2^ test statistic for the covariance at each of the four levels being less than 0.000, less than 0.000, 0.617, and less than 0.000 respectively. It suggested that the two outcomes' correlation at province and county levels still had statistical significance. However, the regression coefficient of TETP for INCOME became negative (-0.052), while that of OSP was still positive (0.044). The negative effect could suggested that longer exposure time to the EMP policy could be associated with a decreased INCOME, and the positive one could suggested that a longer exposure to the EMP may trigger an increased outpatient services in general. These directions of changes fitted the objectives of the EMP policy. Besides, after including time period and hospital resources, the -2\*log likelihood declined to 580308.2 from the dose-response model's value of 624794.3, suggesting that this was a much improved model.

Random coefficients model for TETP {#sec016}
----------------------------------

At last, we fitted a random coefficients model for TETP. The model was as follows, and the results are presented in [Table 6](#pone.0190855.t006){ref-type="table"}.
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###### The fitting results of two responses with five-level model after including the confounders.
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  Effects                                                      OSP                                                       INCOME                                             
  ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------- -------------- --------- --------------- --------- ---------
  **Fixed effects**                                                                                                                                                         
  *Const*(*β*~*0*~, *β*~*1*~)                                  9.622(0.167)                                              3319.7         \<0.000   14.506(0.211)   4726.4    \<0.000
  TETP(*β*~*2*~, *β*~*3*~)                                     0.041(0.017)                                              5.8            0.016     -0.059(0.024)   6.0       0.014
  HTPR                                                         0.291(0.013)                                              501.1          \<0.000   -0.037(0.012)   9.5       0.002
  LTAR                                                         0.031(0.001)                                              961.0          \<0.000   0.005(0.001)    25.0      \<0.000
  Hospital type                                                                                                                                                             
   TH                                                          -0.142(0.026)                                             29.2           \<0.000   -0.644(0.022)   856.9     \<0.000
   TCH                                                         -0.146(0.027)                                             29.8           \<0.000   0.251(0.023)    119.1     \<0.000
  Region                                                                                                                                                                    
   Middle                                                      -0.626(0.275)                                             5.2            0.023     -0.623(0.352)   3.1       0.078
   West                                                        -0.811(0.181)                                             20.1           \<0.000   -0.917(0.225)   16.6      \<0.000
  The first order interaction between TETP and hospital type                                                                                                                
   TETP with TH                                                0.002(0.007)                                              0.1            0.752     0.042(0.006)    49.0      \<0.000
   TETP with TCH                                               0.002(0.008)                                              0.1            0.752     -0.011(0.006)   3.7       0.054
  The first order interaction between TETP and region                                                                                                                       
   TETP with Middle                                            -0.035(0.025)                                             2.0            0.157     0.036(0.037)    0.9       0.343
   TETP with West                                              -0.038(0.021)                                             3.3            0.069     0.008(0.031)    0.1       0.752
  Year                                                                                                                                                                      
   2009                                                        0.074(0.003)                                              608.4          \<0.000   0.231(0.003)    5929.0    \<0.000
   2010                                                        0.075(0.003)                                              625.0          \<0.000   0.481(0.003)    25706.8   \<0.000
   2011                                                        0.081(0.004)                                              410.1          \<0.000   0.816(0.004)    41616.0   \<0.000
   2012                                                        0.174(0.006)                                              841.0          \<0.000   1.017(0.006)    28730.3   \<0.000
  **Random effects**                                                                                                                                                        
  Level 5 (province)                                           ***β (SE)***                                              **χ**^**2**^   ***P***                             
  $\sigma_{g0}^{2}$                                            0.383(0.099)                                              15.0           \<0.001                             
  *σ*~*g*01~                                                   0.450(0.121)                                              13.8           \<0.001                             
  $\sigma_{g1}^{2}$                                            0.683(0.164)                                              17.3           \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*g*02~                                                   0.013(0.006)                                              4.7            0.030                               
  *σ*~*g*12~                                                   0.013(0.008)                                              2.6            0.107                               
  $\sigma_{g2}^{2}$                                            0.003(0.001)                                              9.0            0.003                               
  *σ*~*g*03~                                                   -0.001(0.009)                                             0.01           0.920                               
  *σ*~*g*13~                                                   0.002(0.011)                                              0.03           0.862                               
  *σ*~*g*23~                                                   0.001(0.001)                                              1.0            0.317                               
  $\sigma_{g3}^{2}$                                            0.006(0.002)                                              9.0            0.003                               
  Level 4 (county)                                                                                                                                                          
  $\sigma_{f0}^{2}$                                            0.312(0.010)                                              973.4          \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*f*01~                                                   0.131(0.008)                                              268.1          \<0.000                             
  $\sigma_{f1}^{2}$                                            0.381(0.012)                                              1008.1         \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*f*02~                                                   -0.006(0.002)                                             9.0            0.003                               
  *σ*~*f*12~                                                   -0.002(0.002)                                             1.0            0.317                               
  $\sigma_{f2}^{2}$                                            0.011(0.0005)                                             484.0          \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*f*03~                                                   0.0005(0.002)                                             0.1            0.752                               
  *σ*~*f*13~                                                   -0.028(0.002)                                             196.0          \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*f*23~                                                   0.001(0.0004)                                             6.3            0.012                               
  $\sigma_{f3}^{2}$                                            0.022(0.001)                                              484.0          \<0.000                             
  Level 3 (hospital)                                                                                                                                                        
  $\sigma_{v0}^{2}$                                            0.579(0.005)                                              13409.6        \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*v*01~                                                   0.001(0.003)                                              0.1            0.752                               
  $\sigma_{v1}^{2}$                                            0.362(0.003)                                              14560.4        \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*v*02~                                                   -0.037(0.001)                                             1369.0         \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*v*12~                                                   [\*](#t006fn001){ref-type="table-fn"}0.000 (0.001)        0.0004         0.984                               
  $\sigma_{v2}^{2}$                                            0.022(0.0004)                                             3025.0         \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*v*03~                                                   -0.0001(0.001)                                            0.01           0.920                               
  *σ*~*v*13~                                                   -0.023(0.001)                                             529.0          \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*v*23~                                                   [\*\*](#t006fn002){ref-type="table-fn"}0.000(0.000)       1.0            0.317                               
  $\sigma_{v3}^{2}$                                            [\*\*\*](#t006fn003){ref-type="table-fn"}0.005(0.000)     625.0          \<0.000                             
  Level 2 (time)                                                                                                                                                            
  $\sigma_{u0}^{2}$                                            0.152(0.001)                                              23104.0        \<0.000                             
  *σ*~*u*01~                                                   [\*\*\*\*](#t006fn004){ref-type="table-fn"}0.001(0.000)   6.3            0.012                               
  $\sigma_{u1}^{2}$                                            0.146(0.001)                                              21316.0        \<0.000                             

\*0.00002(0.001);

\*\*0.0002(0.0002);

\*\*\*0.005(0.0001);

\*\*\*\*0.001(0.0004).

The terms *β*~2~, *g*~2*m*~, *f*~2*lm*~ and *v*~2*klm*~ were the fixed parameter, residuals of TETP at level five unit, four unit, and three unit respectively for the dependent variable OSP. Similarly the corresponding terms for the dependent variable INCOME were *β*~3~, *g*~3*m*~, *f*~3*lm*~ and *v*~3*klm*~. The terms *β*~2~ and *β*~3~ were the mean values of TETP for dependent variables OSP and INCOME.

In addition, Ω~*g*~, Ω~*f*~, Ω~*v*~ and Ω~*u*~ were variance and covariance matrices for residual of *const* and TETP at level five unit, four unit, three unit and residual of *const* at level two unit, respectively. They reflected the correlation relationship between OSP and INCOME in terms of their mean values and dose-response effects of the EMP at corresponding levels. For example, the correlation between the two outcomes in term of their dose-response effects at the province level was calculated by *σ*~*g*23~, $\sigma_{g2}^{2}$ and $\sigma_{g3}^{2}$. Finally, the -2\*log likelihood declined to 552211.6, which meant that the good fit was becoming better.

Based on the model estimates, the correlation coefficients of random intercepts between the two outcomes were remained similar as the previous models at all four levels. Based on random slope estimates, greater policy effects on OSP resulted in larger effects on INCOME (r = 0.234) among provincials, but none on the county and facility levels. In addition, the correlation coefficients of OSP between intercepts and slopes were moderately negative among facilities (r = -0.328), and none at the county level. The correlation coefficients of INCOME between intercepts and slopes were negative among counties (r = -0.306), among facilities (r = -0.541), and none at the province level. The results of this model indicated a number of possibilities in practice. Firstly, at provincial level the non-essential medical income decreased more as the exposure time to the EMP policy became longer, and a reversed trend effects of the out-patient services. And such change trends were correlated between the two outcomes. Second, counties with more out-patient services initially tended to have smaller effects of the EMP policy over time, and so was for the INCOME or non-essential medical revenues. Thirdly, facilities having higher INCOME initially tended to achieved less effects of the EMP policy over time.

Discussion {#sec017}
==========

Hospitals or healthcare facilities located in the same area are more similar in terms of number of staff, assets, scale and socio-economic environment, compared to hospitals in different areas. This phenomenon is called clustering \[[@pone.0190855.ref032]\] and is the main reason for regional difference of hospitals' OSP and INCOME distribution. The multiple linear regression model is commonly used to analyze associations based on structured data. Such model, however, has limitations and cannot separate the environmental factors' effects from the variance \[[@pone.0190855.ref033]--[@pone.0190855.ref034]\]. In contrast, the multilevel statistical models could decompose the total variance of the outcome variables into corresponding levels according to data hierarchy \[[@pone.0190855.ref035]\] and have been applied in a variety of fields \[[@pone.0190855.ref036]--[@pone.0190855.ref037]\]. The use of bivariate multilevel models enables us to effectively investigate the correlations between multiple dependent variables with stratification by level of the hierarchy in data \[[@pone.0190855.ref038]\].

For the first and third research questions, the results indicated that provinces with higher mean value of OSP tended to have higher mean value of INCOME, and the same relationship of the two outcomes among counties. Although there was no previous study that directly examined this relationship, it is possible that prescriptions of non-essential medicines, excessive examinations by advanced equipment at out-patient services could rise medical revenue for hospital income as a compensation mechanism for the revenue lost due to the zero-marked essential medicine. However, this correlation was not observed at the hospital or facility level where the motivation of compensation was present. Further research into the implementation of the EMP policy and its impact at the facility level is guaranteed.

For the second and third questions, we found positive dose-response effects for OSP, but negative dose-response effects for INCOME. The findings partly suggested the expected overall effects of the EMP policy, i.e., a longer exposure to the EMP policy was associated with an increased out-patient services overall, but partly a side effects of the financial issue for primary healthcare facilities, i.e., a reduced income associated with longer exposure to the policy. The positive effect of EMP on OSP was supported by some previous studies \[[@pone.0190855.ref007]--[@pone.0190855.ref009], [@pone.0190855.ref039]\]. A study in Hubei province found an obvious increasing in OSP after implementing the EMP \[[@pone.0190855.ref007]\]. A study of primary hospitals showed evidence of the EMP effects in terms of 'two downs and one up": outpatient charges and hospital expenses down, and OSP up \[[@pone.0190855.ref008]\]. A study by Li \[[@pone.0190855.ref009]\] presented an increase of outpatient (including emergency) visits to the township hospitals in Ningxia, Chongqing and Tianjin by 5.7%, 24.0% and 6.2% respectively, in the post-implementation period than in the pre-implementation period. Meanwhile, a study in Anhui province by Xu \[[@pone.0190855.ref039]\] concluded a 22.43% of increase in the average number of outpatient and emergency visits after implementation of the EMP. However, one study did not found the positive effect of EMP on OSP, but reported that the increase in OSP was largely due to over-prescription by many CHCs \[[@pone.0190855.ref019]\]. The negative effect of the EMP on INCOME found in this study was supported by another study \[[@pone.0190855.ref022]\] in which the author showed a drop of the overall income among 63.33% primary hospitals after the implementation of EMP in Hubei province. The negative effect might be induced by the following: The total income of primary hospitals consisted mainly of fiscal subsidies revenue, medical revenue and drug revenue \[[@pone.0190855.ref020]\], and government fiscal subsidies revenue was the basis for ensuring smooth implementation of EMP \[[@pone.0190855.ref021],[@pone.0190855.ref040]\]. In our study, INCOME was made up of mainly fiscal subsidies revenue and medical revenue. Meanwhile, medical revenue actually increased to some extent because of increased services \[[@pone.0190855.ref007]--[@pone.0190855.ref009], [@pone.0190855.ref039]\]. Thus, inadequate subsidies revenue might be the main reason for the negative effect on INCOME, supported by the findings of other studies \[[@pone.0190855.ref008], [@pone.0190855.ref022]\]. Further study is required on government fiscal subsidies policies and how they were implemented at primary hospital level and impacted on the 'true' income of primary hospitals.

For the fourth question, we found that only at provincial level the policy effects on OSP and on INCOME was weakly positive among provinces (r = 0.234). This suggests that there was no evidence to support the hypothesis that effect of the EMP on OSP was linked with that on INCOME at facility or hospital level. Meanwhile, the results of third question were also indicated a lack of significant correlation between the mean values of OSP and INCOME at the hospital level. It is known that before implementing EMP, drug revenue was the main part of the primary hospitals' total income \[[@pone.0190855.ref041]\]. Meanwhile, after implementing EMP, fiscal subsidies revenue and medical revenue were the two main parts of the primary hospitals' total income \[[@pone.0190855.ref041]\]. There was a positive effect of EMP on OSP found in this study and many others, which meant that more and more people are choosing primary hospitals when they seek health care, and this phenomenon actually augments the medical revenue to some extent. However, the hypothesis that increased OSP brings in more INCOME to hospitals as compensation for reduced costs of medicine was not observed at the hospital level. It suggested to us that in general hospitals did not provide services or treatment more than necessary to compensate for the loss of the medicine sales, and compared to medical revenue, fiscal subsidies revenue was a relatively more important part of primary hospitals' total income \[[@pone.0190855.ref020]\]. In addition, the markedly negative correlation coefficients between the mean and policy effects at -0.328 for OSP and -0.541 for INCOME at the hospital level suggested that hospitals with lower mean OSP or INCOME before the policy implementation tended to achieve greater policy effects, i.e. gaining both more OSP and INCOME over the policy exposure period.

Though there was no evidence to suggest an association between OSP and INCOME, in terms of both their means and policy effects at hospital level, the moderately strong association between the two outcomes at the province level could be the result of complex contextual effects. Further research to reveal the context factors and hospital services are required. The phenomenon that hospitals with lower mean value of OSP or INCOME showed greater change in gaining more OSP or INCOME warrants further research on the mechanism by micro-level factors.

Conclusions {#sec018}
===========

The EMP has a positive effect on OSP, but a negative effect on INCOME. There was no evidence to suggest an association between the two outcomes in terms of their mean values and dose-response effects of EMP at the hospital level, which indicated that increased OSP did not bring enough additional INCOME. To ensure smooth implementation of EMP, sustainable mechanisms to compensate primary hospitals by government are needed.

Limitation {#sec019}
==========

A number of limitations in the study should be reminded for the interpretation of the findings. Firstly, due to availability of the data, we did not have context variables at the levels of province and county to explain variabilities in the outcome variables at the corresponding levels. Second, we could not separate the true income revenue from subsidies ones in the INCOME variable. The total income of primary healthcare facilities came from a number of sources: medical revenue, fiscal subsidies, higher facilities subsidies and other incomes such as facility initiated complementary services for fees. The INCOME variable used in the study was the total income minus essential medical revenue. The higher facilities subsidies were usually small and variable among facilities, which had little impact on the finding. The finding of increased income in the study could be confounded with increasing of fiscal subsidies revenue. However, since the increasing of fiscal subsides was generally the same to all primary healthcare facilities nationwide, such effects would have be captured by the time effects in our model. The dose-response effects in relation to the policy should be unaffected. Thirdly, we used OSP, but the INCOME included outpatient and hospitalization parts; however, the medical income of primary hospitals came mainly from the outpatient part. Lastly, because the EMP was implemented in a temporal sequence, it led to different primary hospitals with different time exposed to the policy.
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